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WORKS IN PROGRESS: CONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION 
OF TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 
Lance Compa 
Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
This paper reviews labor rights in the trade arrangements of four regional and binational settings 
in the Americas: 
• the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among Canada, Mexico and the 
United States; 
• the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay; 
• the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA); and 
• the Caribbean Community (Caricom) embracing several island nations in a common 
market. 
The labor rights agreements, charters and declarations examined here are at different levels of 
development and experience. They are "works in progress," just beginning to experiment with 
the central challenge of ensuring that no country gains competitive advantage in an integrated 
market by violating workers' fundamental rights. Each labor rights system studied here takes a 
different approach to this challenge. Sometimes the differences are slight, as with the labor 
agreements under NAFTA and the CCFTA; sometimes the differences are dramatic, as between 
social dimensions in NAFTA and Mercosur. 
While this paper mainly explores differences, these attempts to build a social dimension into 
trade agreements have many similarities. They specify workers' basic rights. They define 
obligations of states (and sometimes of private actors) to respect those rights. They create an 
oversight mechanism to examine compliance, including opportunities for workers to invoke the 
mechanism. They stress cooperation among states and between trade unions and employers in 
resolving disputes. They provide a measure of reproof when violations are found, though here 
significant differences emerge on the issue of "linkage" and whether reproof is limited to public 
exposure or whether economic sanctions may be used to enforce workers' rights. 
The Americas' experience is part of an even larger effort to construct a social dimension in trade 
regimes. While these instruments are new, the spirit of social justice that animates them is old. 
The same concerns inspired the White Phosphorus convention a century ago; the founding of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1919; the ambitious but doomed social plan for the 
International Trade Organization (ITO) after World War II; and today's demands for a labor 
rights working party at the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
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The dynamics of a globalizing economy and the related ability of multinational firms to make 
and withdraw investment anywhere in the world are seen by tree trade proponents as "creative 
destruction" spreading the benefits of the market economy to ever-wider circles of countries and 
peoples. But investment and disinvestment are often made suddenly and with dire consequences 
for many workers and communities, who see mostly destruction in the new free trade model. 
The demand for social justice in a process of economic globalization looks inevitably for a 
political opening. Workers, trade unions and their allies have demonstrated the will and the 
capacity to force a social dimension onto the trade policy agenda. The new, and in many respects 
still untested, results of their efforts in four trade areas of the Americas are presented here. 
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE NORTH 
AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was negotiated in the early 1990s during 
the administrations of U.S. President George Bush, Mexican President Carlos Salinas, and 
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. The three leaders announced agreement on NAFTA in 
August 1992 just as the U.S. presidential race of that year was heating up. Labor, environmental 
and human rights organizations pressured candidate Bill Clinton to repudiate NAFTA in his 
campaign for the presidency. They charged that the agreement favored multinational 
corporations and investors at the expense of workers and the environment. 
Responding to both pro- and anti-NAFTA forces, candidate Clinton opted to support NAFTA if 
"side agreements" dealing with labor and the environment were added to the package sent to 
Congress for approval.1 After taking office in January 1993, the new Clinton Administration 
began negotiations on these issues with Mexico and Canada. Agreements were reached in August 
1993 on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) and a companion 
environmental accord, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC). All three agreements took effect January 1, 1994. 
Introducing the NAALC 
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) is the first international labor 
agreement directly connected to a trade pact with potential for economic sanctions as a means of 
enforcing labor rights. The accomplishments cited by NAALC supporters, and the shortcomings 
noted by NAALC detractors, provide important lessons for future attempts to fashion a viable 
labor rights-trade linkage. 
'Clinton's position was spelled out in a major campaign speech advertised as his definitive campaign statement on 
trade policy. See Governor Bill Clinton, Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs, Address at North Carolina 
State University, Raleigh, North Carolina (October 4, 1992). 
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One starting point for understanding the NAALC is to set out two things it does not do: 
• It does not set new common standards to which countries must adjust their laws and 
regulations. Instead, the NAALC stresses sovereignty in each country's internal labor 
affairs, recognizing "the right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor 
standards." 
• The NAALC does not create a supranational administrative tribunal to take evidence and 
decide guilt or innocence in labor disputes or to order remedies against violators. This is 
left to national authorities applying national law. Nor does it create a supranational labor 
judicial body to take appeals from decisions of national tribunals and overrule decisions 
that arguably fail to "enforce" the NAALC. Decisions by the national courts are 
undisturbed by the NAALC. 
Instead of an international enforcement system, the NAALC countries have created an oversight, 
review and dispute resolution system designed to hold each other accountable for performance in 
eleven defined areas of labor law. Oversight is conducted first by a review body in another 
government. Then, depending on the subject area, evaluation and arbitration can be had by 
independent, non-governmental committees or panels. 
The NAALC also includes provisions for sanctions. A fine of up to .007 percent of the volume of 
trade between the two disputing countries can be levied against a government if it fails to adopt 
an "action plan" recommended by an Arbitral Panel upon a finding of persistent pattern of failure 
to effectively enforce its laws related to one of three labor principles susceptible to dispute 
resolution.2 This fine was approximately $20 million when the NAALC took effect; it is now 
over $50 million with the increase in the volume of trade among the three NAFTA partners. 
The fine must be expended at the direction of the NAALC ministerial council to improve 
enforcement in the subject area of the arbitration. If the country complained against fails to pay 
the fine, the other countries may suspend NAFTA tariff benefits in an amount and for a time 
necessary to collect the fine. Such suspension of beneficial tariff treatment would apply to the 
"same sector or sectors" where violations of workers' rights occurred.3 
It should be noted at the outset that no NAALC case has reached this stage. Practically speaking, 
it is unlikely that a case would reach this point because NAALC procedures include ample 
opportunity for a cooperative solution to disputes before reaching a point of sanctions. 
2NAALC Articles 38-40; Annex 39. 
3Id., Article 41; Annex 4 IB. Canada guarantees payment of any fine and is not subject to suspension of benefits. 
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Labor Principles and Obligations of the NAALC 
Under the NAALC, the United States, Mexico and Canada "are committed to promote" the 
following labor principles: (1) freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; (2Y 
the right to bargain collectively; (3) the right to strike; (4) prohibition of forced labor; (5) labor 
protections for children and young persons; (6) minimum employment standards; (7) elimination 
of employment discrimination; (8) equal pay for women and men; (9) prevention of occupational 
injuries and illnesses; (10) compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses; and (H) 
protection of migrant workers.4 
In connection with the eleven labor principles, the three countries adopt six "obligations" for 
effective labor law enforcement to fulfill the principles.5 These obligations include: 
• a general duty to provide high labor standards; 
• effective enforcement of labor laws; 
• access to administrative and judicial fora for workers whose rights are violated; 
• due process, transparency, speed, and effective remedies in labor law proceedings; 
• public availability of labor laws and regulations, and opportunity for "interested persons" 
to comment on proposed changes; 
• promoting public awareness of labor law and workers' rights. 
Institutional Structure of the NAALC 
Commission for Labor Cooperation: Ministerial Council and Secretariat 
The NAALC creates a Commission for Labor Cooperation that includes a Ministerial Council 
and a permanent Secretariat. The labor ministers of each country are the Council that governs the 
Commission. The Commission's Secretariat was first based in Dallas, Texas, where it began 
operations in September, 1995. The Secretariat staff includes a dozen labor lawyers, economists 
and other professionals (four from each country) experienced in labor affairs in their countries. 
The NAALC Labor Secretariat undertakes comparative studies and reports on labor laws and 
labor markets of the three countries and serves as the general administrative arm of the 
Commission. The Secretariat would also serve as the support staff of an Evaluation Committee 
or Arbitral Panel. In 2000, the Secretariat moved from Dallas to Washington, D.C. 
4
 Id., Annex 1. 
5Id., Articles 2-7. 
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National Administrative Offices (NAOs) 
The NAALC also sets up a National Administrative Office (NAO) in the labor department of 
each country. The NAOs receive complaints ("public communications" or "submissions" in 
NAALC parlance) from the public related to any of the eleven labor principles. There is no 
limitation on who may file a complaint. In the interest of having the process as open and 
accessible as possible, the regulations of each NAO set a fairly low threshold for acceptance for 
review.6 
The scope of such reviews is "labor law matters arising in the territory of another Party."7 This is 
an unusual but critical feature of the NAALC. Employers, workers, unions and allied NGOs must 
file their submissions with the NAO in another country, not the country where alleged violations 
occurred, to start the review process. The United States and Canada hold public hearings on 
complaints with transcripts and sworn testimony; the Mexican NAO holds private "informative 
sessions." 
The NAOs issue public reports on submissions they have accepted for review. The public report 
contains a key make-or-break conclusion: whether or not it recommends ministerial 
consultations. If not, the matter is closed. If so, the matter moves forward. These ministerial 
consultations are open-ended efforts to resolve a problem before it enlarges. They have generally 
led to further hearings, special research reports, seminars and conferences, worker education 
programs and the like. 
Evaluation Committees of Experts 
After ministerial consultations, the labor minister of a single country can request and obtain an 
independent Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) to pursue a matter. An ECE performs an 
independent evaluation of all three countries' labor law enforcement effectiveness in the matter 
forwarded for study. 
At this stage, though, certain subject matters are not susceptible to ECE treatment. Namely, the 
so-called "industrial relations principles"-- involving freedom of association, collective 
bargaining and the right to strike — cannot be taken up by an ECE. This means that ECEs are 
empowered to evaluate the countries' record in one or more of the following eight labor law 
matters, depending on the scope of the request: forced labor; child labor; minimum employment 
6See Revised Notice of Establishment of United States National Administrative Office and Procedural 
Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,660-62 (1994); Regulation of the National Administrative Office of Mexico, Diario 
Oficial de la Federacion, April 28, 1995; Canadian NAO Guidelines for Public Communications, available at 
Canadian NAO web site, http://labour.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/doc/ialc-cidt/eng/e/guidlns-e.html (November 23, 1998). 
7J., Article 16(3). 
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standards; employment discrimination; equal pay for women and men; occupational safety and 
health; workers' compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses; and migrant workers' 
protection. 
Arbitral Panels 
Of the eight principles susceptible to an ECE listed above, five cannot move from the ECE to the 
arbitration stage. After an ECE report, two out of three countries' labor ministers can demand an 
independent Arbitral Panel if they believe there is still a "persistent pattern of failure" by the 
third country to effectively enforce domestic labor laws in one or more of the three remaining 
areas: child labor; minimum wage; and occupational safety and health. 
The Arbitral Panel is empowered to issue an "action plan" to be implemented by the country 
under scrutiny. If the government refuses or fails to implement the plan, the Panel can fine the 
offending government up to .007 percent of the volume of trade between the countries. The fine 
must be used to improve domestic labor law enforcement in the area or sector that provoked the 
complaint. If the fine is not paid, trade sanctions can be applied against firms or sector where 
violations occurred. 
NAALC Complaints and Cases 
By the middle of 1999, nearly 20 complaints had been filed under the NAALC. The rate of 
submissions increased each year, and 1998 and 1999 saw the first cases dealing with Canadian 
labor law matters, the first case filed by Mexico's official CTM union federation, the first case 
filed by an employer organization, and several cases dealing with matters susceptible to 
evaluation and dispute resolution (though none has yet reached either stage). These 
developments suggest that the NAALC is getting some traction dealing with issues of workers' 
rights in North America and is likely to be a sustained forum for labor rights advocacy.8 Three 
cases, one from each country, are selected here to illustrate how the case system operates: 
Pregnancy Testing in the Maquiladoras (U.S. NAO Case No. 9701) 
Two U.S.-based human rights groups, Human Rights Watch and the International Labor Rights 
Fund, along with the Asociacion Nacional de Abogados Democrdticos (ANAD) of Mexico, filed 
a complaint with the NAO of the United States in May 1997 alleging "a pattern of widespread, 
"Sometimes the NAALC has had an effect without a case being filed. In Canada, for example, the conservative 
provincial government of Alberta proposed a plan to privatize occupational safety and health enforcement in 1996. 
Labor advocates argued that the government was abdicating its enforcement of labor laws on workplace safety and 
health, and announced plans to file a NAALC complaint. The government dropped the proposal. See Allan 
Chambers, Privatization of labour rules raises fears: Law may face NAFTA challenge, Edmonton Journal, 
September 6, 1996, at 1; Province's Halt of Privatization Plan Ends Looming NAFTA Complaint, Inside NAFTA, 
December 25, 1996, at 14. 
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state-tolerated sex discrimination against prospective and actual female workers in the 
maquiladora sector along the Mexico-U.S. border."9 The submission alleged a common practice 
requiring pregnancy testing of all female job applicants and denying employment to pregnant 
applicants. The complaint also said that employers pressure employees who become pregnant to 
leave their jobs. 
The submitters argued that the practice by employers and the failure of the labor authorities to 
combat it ~ sometimes by omission, sometimes by overt support for the employers' 
discriminatory policy — violates Mexico's obligations under the NAALC. The complaint sought 
a U.S. NAO review, public hearings, and the formation of an Evaluation Committee of Experts 
to report on employment practices related to pregnancy in all three NAALC countries.10 
A public hearing by the U.S. NAO generated widespread publicity about the practice involving 
well-known American firms like General Motors, Zenith, and Motorola. In January 1998 the 
U.S. NAO issued a report confirming widespread pregnancy testing that discriminates against 
female workers and recommending ministerial consultations in the matter. 
Concluding ministerial consultations in October 1998, the labor ministers of Canada, Mexico and 
the United States approved a program of workshops for government enforcement officials, 
outreach to women workers and an international conference on gender discrimination issues. 
These programs have been underway, most recently with an international conference on women 
workers held in Mexico in March 1999, and with "outreach sessions" for women workers held 
along the U.S.-Mexico border. In the meantime, U.S. companies in the maquiladora zones 
announced they would halt pregnancy testing, and the Mexican federal government has 
prohibited pregnancy testing of females applying for employment in federal ministries. The 
pregnancy testing case may still give rise to the first ECE under the NAALC. 
Washington State Apple Industry (Mexico NAO Case No. 9802) 
A coalition of Mexican trade unions and farmworker organizations filed a wide-ranging 
complaint in May 1998 alleging failure of U.S. labor law to protect workers' rights in the 
Washington State apple industry. The submission cited the lack of legal protection for 
farmworker union organizing, widespread health and safety violations, discrimination against 
migrant workers, and employers' use of threats and intimidation in recent union representation 
elections in apple packing and shipping facilities. 
The Union Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT), a new independent labor federation, the Frente 
Autentico del Trabajo (FAT), another independent labor group, and the Frente Democrdtico 
9See U.S. NAO Case No. 9701, Submission Concerning Pregnancy-Based Sex Discrimination in Mexico's 
Maquiladora Sector, at 4. 
wId., at 37-39. 
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Campesino (FDC) of Mexico filed the complaint with the Mexican NAO. In preparing the 
submission, they collaborated with the U.S. Teamsters union and the United Farm Workers 
union, which are conducting organizing campaigns in the apple sector. The complaint called on 
the Mexican government to pursue multiple stages of review, consultation, evaluation, and 
arbitration under the NAALC. 
This submission is the broadest case yet filed under the NAALC,11 citing labor law violations 
and inadequate enforcement involving seven of the NAALC's eleven labor principles. The 
Washington State apple industry complaint covers the right to organize, collective bargaining, 
minimum labor standards, non-discrimination in employment, job safety and health, workers' 
compensation, and migrant worker protection. The filing generated a burst of publicity calling 
attention to conditions of migrant workers and the opportunity for advocacy presented by the 
NAALC.12 
The NAO of Mexico accepted the Washington State apple case for review in August 1998. In 
December 1998 the NAO of Mexico held its first-ever hearing on a NAALC complaint. It was 
not a public hearing in the quasi-legal style of the U.S. and Canadian NAOs, but rather an 
"informative session" under the Mexican NAO procedural guidelines conducted in private in a 
roundtable setting. A delegation of workers from packing sheds and orchards in Washington 
State attended the session and presented direct testimony about pesticide poisoning, discharge for 
union activity, minimum wage violations, discrimination in the workers' compensation system, 
discrimination against migrant workers, and other violations of workers' rights. 
The hearing garnered widespread publicity in the news media of both the United States and 
Mexico.13 The NAO of Mexico was to issue its report in February 1999, but it was delayed by 
personnel changes in the department of labor and the NAO. The report was finally issued in 
August 1999, and on August 20 Mexico's Secretary of Labor formally requested ministerial 
consultations with the U.S. Secretary of Labor. This development sparked a new round of 
publicity and related attention to the conditions of migrant workers in the apple industry.14 
"Most earlier cases addressed union organizing issues. 
12See, for example, Steven Greenhouse, Mexicans Were Denied U.S. Rights, Suit Says, New York Times, May 28, 
1998, at A18; Ken Guggenheim, U.S. unions find new tool, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 29, 1998, at CI; Raul 
Trejo Delarbre, Casablanca Laboral, La Cronica, June 1, 1998. 
See Molly Moore, Mexican Farmhands Accuse U.S. Firms: Panel Hears Washington Apple Pickers, 
Washington Post, December 3, 1998, at A36; Elizabeth Velasco, Trabajadores agricolas denuncian^explotacion en 
EU, La Jornada, December 3, 1998, at 41; Arturo Gomez Salgado, Denuncian migr antes violaciones labor ales. El 
Financiero, December 3, 1998, at 19. 
See, for example, Arthur C. Gorlick, State's apple hands abused, Mexico says: Complaint could lead to special 
investigation and even sanctions, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 9, 1999, at Al; Farm workers are the 
subsidy, lead editorial, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 19, 1999 (beginning: "Mexico's accusation that 
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McDonald's (U.S. NAO Case No. 9803). 
Joined by the Quebec Federation of Labor and the International Labor Rights Fund, the 
Teamsters union and its Quebec affiliates filed a complaint in October 1998 before the U.S. 
NAO on the closure of a McDonald's restaurant in St-Hubert, Quebec, shortly before the union 
was certified to bargain for workers there. This was the first NAALC case implicating labor law 
in a Canadian jurisdiction. 
Submitters argued that McDonald's used loopholes and delaying tactics to string out union 
representation proceedings before the Quebec labor board for one year. McDonald's routinely 
appealed decisions in the union's favor. Finally it shut the restaurant when the union certification 
was about to be issued. 
Although Quebec labor law is generally favorable to workers and unions, it is impotent dealing 
with anti-union workplace closures. The Quebec courts evolved a doctrine allowing employers to 
close facilities to avoid unionization with impunity — the only jurisdiction in North America that 
does so.15 
In December 1998 the U.S. NAO announced that it accepted the McDonald's case for review.16 
In April 1999 the petitioners withdrew their complaint following an agreement by the Quebec 
government to undertake a special study of the question of anti-union plant workplace closures in 
the context of an overall review of the Quebec Labor Code.17 
Evaluation 
Evaluating results of the NAALC is largely a matter of interpretation. At the Prince Edward 
Island ministerial meeting in October 1998, the three governments expressed general satisfaction 
with the results. They cited mainly the fruits of cooperative activities such as the increase in 
knowledge about each other's labor markets and labor law systems. At the same time, they 
pledged to "improve the future operations and effectiveness of the NAALC." 
Washington tolerates abuse of farm workers will be debated . . . but there's no debating that some agricultural sectors 
owe their success to systematic exploitation of migrant workers."). 
15See reference to Quebec law and jurisprudence in Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, Plant 
Closings and Labor Rights (1997), at 34 (available at web site of the Secretariat, www.naalc.org). 
i6See Toronto Star, U.S. labour body probes anti-union move in Quebec, December 21, 1998, arD3 (Associated 
Press wire story). 
"See letter from Claude Melancon, Teamsters Canada attorney, to Irasema Garza, U.S. NAO Secretary, April 
14, 1999. 
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Trade unions and allied NGOs, on one hand, and business organizations, on the other hand, all 
criticize the NAALC vociferously, but from diametrically opposed perspectives. The Canadian 
Labour Congress said "it falls far short of the mechanisms necessary to truly remedy market 
failures and halt the downward pressures on wages and standards.... [E]ven when the workers 
have proven their case satisfactorily, the remedies have been inconsequential and the abuses have 
continued."18 The AFL-CIO said the NAALC has "failed to achieve its stated goals." Some 
independent (i.e., not affiliated with the ruling PRI) Mexican union organizations said the 
NAALC "has not represented a real social counterweight to free trade" and "has shown serious 
limitations as an instrument" for improving workers' rights.19 
Business organizations frowned on contentious aspects of the NAALC, especially the 
submissions process. They called instead for the NAALC to emphasize cooperative activities. 
The U.S. Council for International Business argued that the NAALC "has unduly emphasized 
[submissions] over positive cooperative activities ... it sets the wrong tone and focus." The 
U.S.CIB said that NAO acceptance of a submission should be an "exceptional act" after all 
domestic legal procedures have been exhausted, and that the sole results of submissions should 
be "joint studies and technical cooperation and assistance." Citing the practice of the ILO and the 
OECD, the U.S. employer council argued that the name of a specific company should not be part 
of the record in any submission, and that NAOs should not hold public hearings because they are 
"too confrontational."20 
Mexico's Enterprise Coordinating Council (CCE), Coordination of Foreign Trade Enterprise 
Organisms (COECE), and Confederation of Chambers of Commerce (CONCAMIN) criticized 
the "publicity" surrounding NAALC cases in connection with "premature" acceptance of cases. 
They called public hearings by the U.S. NAO "contrary to Mexican sovereignty" and argued that 
no submission or related report should contain the name of a specific company.21 A prominent 
consultant who earlier served in the Mexican labor ministry attributed the NAALC solely to 
pressure from anti-NAFTA protectionist groups in the United States and characterized actions of 
the U.S. NAO in accepting cases and holding hearings as a "distortion" of the NAALC.22 
18See Review of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (1999), Public Comment of Robert 
White, President of the Canadian Labour Congress, on file with Secretariat of the Commission for Labor 
Cooperation, Dallas, Texas, and available on the Commission's web site at www.naalc.org. 
19See id., Public Comments of Berta Lujan, General Coordinator, Red Mexicana de Accion Frente al Libre 
Comercio; Francisco Hernandez Juarez, President, Union Nacional de Trabajadores. -' -
20See id., Public Comment of Abraham Katz, President, U.S. Council for International Business. 
See id., Public Comment of Juan Gallardo on behalf of these organizations. 
See id., Public Comment of Norma Samaniego de Villareal, Directora General, Santa Fe Consultores, S.C. 
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The public comments for the Commission's 4-year review were made in early 1998, when a total 
often complaints had been submitted under the NAALC, and nine of them involved labor law 
matters in Mexico. This created an impression that NAFTA's labor side agreement was really an 
exercise in Mexico-bashing, not a balanced agreement subjecting each country equally to 
scrutiny by its partners. In 1998, though, the submission of important new complaints like the 
Washington State apple case and the Canadian McDonald's case has brought more equilibrium 
to the NAALC. 
Perhaps the most important outgrowth of the NAALC and its complaint mechanism is an 
unprecedented increase in exchange, communication and coordination among labor rights 
advocates and labor researchers at the trinational level. The NAALC's submission mechanism 
has sparked a significant increase in cross-border labor and NGO collaboration. Since a 
submission about workers' rights violations and failure of government authorities to effectively 
enforce domestic law in one country must be submitted with the NAO of another country, 
submitters are encouraged to seek partners in the other country to assist in pursuing the case in 
the other country's NAO review process. Nearly every submission has been signed by a coalition 
of organizations based in at least two countries, and sometimes in all three. 
The NAALC contains many procedural and substantive flaws giving rise to valid criticisms. 
These include its lack of harmonized standards, the absence of concrete remedies for workers 
whose rights are violated, and the lesser treatment afforded fundamental rights of association ~ 
organizing, collective bargaining and the right to strike. However, even justifiable criticism 
should not be measured against a theoretically ideal but practically unattainable agreement 
linking trade and labor rights. Criticism must take into account the reality of international 
relations and trade and labor controversies in the global economy today. 
That reality begins with a strong concern for sovereignty in labor affairs that is generally shared 
by all countries, rich and poor. Sovereignty is an especially sensitive matter among NAALC 
partners, given the relative weight of the United States in continental affairs. The sovereignty 
issue is joined by a fear on the part of developing countries that a labor rights-trade linkage will 
be used for protectionist purposes by larger, richer countries to deprive them of a comparative 
advantage in lower labor costs. 
The approach developed in the NAALC, emphasizing cooperation and effective enforcement of 
domestic labor law, is a more practical and attainable starting point for an accord linking labor 
rights and trade. Any system of law is only as good as its enforcement system. U.S. experience 
with a resurgent "sweatshop" industry in major American cities should give pause to demands 
that developing countries raise their standards to the levels of industrialized countries before 
labor law enforcement is strengthened in every country.23 
23For an extensive treatment of sweatshops in the United States, see Andrew Ross, ed., N o SWEAT: FASHION, 
FREE TRADE, AND THE RIGHTS OF GARMENT WORKERS (1997). 
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While preserving sovereignty in labor matters, the NAALC countries opened themselves up to 
international scrutiny of their labor law enforcement regimes, first through reviews by another 
country's NAO, then by independent evaluation or dispute resolution bodies made up of 
independent, non-governmental experts from all three countries. This represents an extraordinary 
degree of candor in international labor matters. 
The NAALC's broad subject matter is another positive feature. The labor principles include 
"core" standards, but they go farther to embrace other matters vitally important to workers ~ 
safety and health, minimum wages, hours of work, compensation for workplace injuries and 
illnesses, and migrant worker protection. 
The NAALC is "user-friendly," with both cooperative activities and complaint mechanisms open 
to participation not only by unions and employers, but also by NGOs and concerned citizens. 
None of these need to have a material interest in a matter, and they can approach any of the three 
NAOs for attention to the issues they want to raise. The NAALC mechanism requiring 
complaints about events in one country to be submitted to authorities in another country drives a 
process of communication and collaboration across national borders by trade unions, NGOs and 
other social actors. 
The NAALC's spirit of respect for sovereignty alongside openness to international scrutiny and 
mutual accountability, the reach of its labor principles beyond a "core" formulation, its openness 
to civil society involvement, and its encouragement of international labor solidarity and 
collaboration provide important lessons for governments and social actors grappling with the 
challenge of linking trade and international labor rights on the eve of the 21st century. 
MERCOSUR AND THE SOCIAL-LABOR DECLARATION 
The Common Market of the South (Mercosur)24 has moved rapidly in recent years, even recent 
months, to develop a social dimension to its economic integration arrangements. Since the 
initiation of the regional trade group with the Treaty of Asuncion (March 26,1991), there are 
three main institutional markers of Mercosur's social dimension: 
Sub-Group 11 (SGI 1) from 1991 through 1994; 
• Working Group 10 (WG10) and the Economic and Social Consultative Forum (ESCF) 
from 1994 to the present; and 
• Since late 1998, the Social-Labor Declaration of Mercosur and the related Social-Labor 
Commission. 
24The four Mercosur members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Chile and Bolivia are associate 
members. 
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Sub-Group 11 
When the Mercosur took shape in 1991, a reference to "social justice" in the Preamble of the 
Treaty of Asuncion was the only nod to a social dimension in regional trade plans. Very soon, 
however, labor ministers of the member countries responded to demands from labor and civil 
society by adopting the Montevideo Declaration (May 9, 1991) insisting that the trade group 
address labor and social issues. 
The Mercosur governments acted in December 1991 to create Sub-Group 11 (SGI 1) on labor, 
employment and social security, alongside other subgroups dealing with trade issues. SGI 1 set 
up eight committees dealing with individual and collective labor relations, employment, migrant 
workers, training, health and safety, sectoral issues in transportation and agriculture, and ILO 
Conventions. 
SGI 1 held its first meeting in March 1992 and its last meeting in November 1994. The group and 
its committees were tripartite in structure, but only government representatives could approve 
their non-binding recommendations to the Mercosur governments. SGI 1 carried out an 
examination of ILO ratifications by member countries and comparative studies on labor costs 
and labor legislation. 
Also significant is what SGI 1 did not do: it never adopted a Charter of Fundamental Labor and 
Social Rights called for by the Coordination of Trade Union Centrals of the Southern Cone 
(CTUCSC). This trade union coordinating body was formed in 1986 when it became clear that 
expanded regional trade was inevitable. Grouping the major labor federations of the four member 
countries, the CTUCSC drafted a comprehensive Social Charter with 79 articles covering a broad 
range of political, civil, economic, and social rights. The proposed charter also contained 
"linkage" of labor rights and trade requiring economic sanctions against countries, sectors, or 
companies that violate workers' rights. 
Mercosur governments rejected the idea of a trade-linked Social Charter at a presidential summit 
meeting in August 1994. Brazil was willing to adopt a broad charter with no economic sanctions. 
Argentina said that a social charter should be taken up at the end of the process of economic 
integration, not at the beginning. Buenos Aires was willing to adopt a NAALC-style accord 
committing the countries to effective enforcement of national legislation on core labor standards 
and a complaint system with limited sanctions. At the end of the day the governments could not 
reach a consensus. But the exercise is seen by social charter proponents as worthwhile and 
important because it laid the groundwork for later consideration of the 1998 Social-Labor 
Declaration of Mercosur. Labor rights advocates hope that the Declaration is a bridge to an, 
effective social charter to be won in the future.25 
25See Geraldo von Potobsky, La Declaration Sociolaboral del Mercosur, REVISTA DEL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO 
(publication of the Ministry of Labor of Argentina, July 1999). 
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Working Group 10 
SGI 1 ceased functioning at the end of 1994 in anticipation of the new Protocol of Ouro Preto 
(December 17, 1994) that finalized Mercosur's institutional structure. The Protocol established 
the Common Market Council (CMC) as the highest ruling body. Made up of Foreign Affairs and 
Economics ministers, the CMC meets twice yearly to take overarching decisions for the regional 
trade group. The Common Market Group (CMG) became the executive operational body of 
Mercosur. It meets several times yearly to adopt resolutions forwarded by subgroups and 
committees. Representatives of Finance ministries joined those from Foreign Affairs and 
Economics on the CMG. The Protocol also established a Trade Commission and a Joint 
Parliamentary Commission. 
The Mercosur countries took two new measures in Ouro Preto dealing with a social dimension to 
their trade arrangements. A new Working Group 10 (WG10) took over labor matters. The eight 
committees of SGI 1 were reduced to three: one on employment relations; one on employment, 
migration and training; and one on health and safety, labor inspection and social security. 
Alongside WG10, but distinctive both in structure and mission, the Protocol established a new 
Economic and Social Consultative Forum. 
WG10 is composed of labor ministry officials of each Mercosur member government, but its 
three committees retain the tripartite government-labor-business structure of their predecessors, 
with one representative from each sector from each of the four countries. Labor and business 
representatives have the right to vote in committee on conclusions and recommendations to send 
to the full Working Group. They may also participate in WG10 meetings and express their views, 
but labor and business representatives may not vote on decisions to forward matters to the 
Common Market Group. 
A parallel structure is established within each country. Country committees have often invited 
non-governmental organizations like consumer groups, international organizations like the ILO, 
and labor centrals that might not have a seat on the committee to participate in committee 
meetings. Both national committees and WG10 have contracted with experts for special working 
groups or technical committees on particular subject matters. 
When it began functioning in 1995, WG10 picked up where its predecessor SG11 had ended. 
WG10 continued analyzing Mercosur countries' ratification and implementation of ILO 
Conventions, noting that Paraguay lagged far behind its partners with 35 ratifications, compared 
with 102 for Uruguay, 85 for Brazil and 69 for Argentina. It resumed comparative labor law 
studies on such issues as termination of employment contracts, temporary employment, hours of 
work, and probation periods, identifying asymmetries that saw Uruguay emerge as the exception, 
with a relatively spare labor law regime compared with the highly detailed labor codes of its 
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Mercosur partners. An attempt to compare labor costs factoring in labor law and social security 
indices on a country-by-country basis foundered on methodological difficulties. The CMG 
instructed WGIO to undertake industry-by-industry salary studies instead.26 
Under WGIO auspices, unprecedented multilateral labor inspections were carried out in all four 
countries in 1997 and 1998. Tripartite representatives joined labor inspectors from each country 
reviewing payroll records and examining health and safety conditions at construction sites in 
each country, followed by a review and discussion of the experience. Though limited, such 
activity can be viewed as a prototype of eventual enforcement of common labor standards. 
WGIO also resumed discussion of a Social Charter, pressed anew by the CTUCSC with demands 
for linkage to trade disciplines. Although the social charter did not advance institutionally, 
keeping the debate alive is seen by labor rights advocates as contributing to one of WGlO's 
signal achievements, the later adoption of the Social-Labor Declaration of Mercosur. 
Between 1995 and 1998, Mercosur's Working Group 10 made concrete advances in three major 
projects. First, it achieved a Multilateral Agreement on Social Security to regulate eligibility and 
benefits for workers employed outside their own country. The social security agreement did not 
harmonize benefits at higher common denominators, a goal sought by the trade unions but 
opposed by employers and some governments. However, it did establish guarantees that workers 
will receive proper credits for employment in another country on which their benefits will be 
based, and that they will receive the health insurance, pensions and other benefits due them ~ 
normally, the benefits provided in the country of employment for the period of employment in 
that country. The agreement also called for creation of a 12-member tripartite commission to 
oversee its implementation. 
The social security agreement was adopted in December 1997 by the Council, the highest 
Mercosur body. It still awaits ratification by the parliaments of the member countries, a 
necessary step for implementation. Nevertheless, says one expert, 
the fact that it is the first social-labor disposition resulting from Mercosur 
institutions, with the added value of its tripartite preparation, discussion and 
analysis, gives the Agreement symbolic value for the social actors who in seven 
years of prior activity had not succeeded in crystallizing any proposal with 
substantive content.27 
A second achievement of WGIO was the creation of a permanent Labor Market Observatory. The 
Observatory is a technical organ designed to provide "real-time" comparative information pn 
16
 See Pablo Amoldo Topet, Integration Regional y Relaciones Labor ales Mercosur (ILO background paper, 
January 1999), at 36. 
27See Topet, op.cit, at 36 (author's translation). 
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labor market indicators to Mercosur governments to help them coordinate employment policies. 
Like other Mercosur social initiatives, the Observatory has a tripartite institutional structure. A 
12-member management council named by WGIO oversees a small technical secretariat of four 
persons, one from each country selected by the country's tripartite national section. Not having a 
specified source of funding, the technical secretariat is staffed by labor ministry employees still 
located in each country's labor ministry. This secretariat carries out a work plan adopted by the 
management council. 
Although it does not have its own office or discretionary budget, the Mercosur Labor Market 
Observatory has been able to develop an information bank on comparative labor market 
indicators and plans to establish a web site on the Intemet by the end of 1999. WGIO has charged 
the Observatory with conducting new sectoral labor market studies in textile, agriculture, land 
transport and other industries. 
Before turning to the new Social-Labor Declaration of Mercosur and the even newer Mercosur 
Social-Labor Commission, a second initiative undertaken at Ouro Preto must be examined. The 
1994 Protocol created an Economic and Social Consultative Forum (ESCF) as a setting for trade 
unions, employers and non-governmental organizations to voice their views and concerns about 
economic integration in the subregion. Like other Mercosur institutions, the ESCF is tripartite in 
structure, but with a key distinction: the Forum does not include government representatives. The 
three sectors of the ESCF are labor, business and NGOs. 
Each of the four Mercosur countries has nine seats on the ESCF, making for a plenary body of 36 
members. Each country may choose through its internal processes its nine members, with the 
sole requirement that the number of labor and business seats be equal. Thus, for example, labor 
and business could have two seats each, opening up five seats to NGOs. In practice, the countries 
have generally chosen three labor and three business representatives, with three NGO 
representatives joining them in the national delegation. NGO participants have come from 
consumer, environmental, educational, legal and other civil society groups. 
The ESCF began functioning in 1996 after its four national sections were formed. It is a strictly 
advisory body, able only to forward non-binding recommendations to the Common Market 
Group. In its twice-yearly meetings between 1996 and 1998, the ESCF formulated a handful of 
recommendations for the CMG on promotion of employment, defense of the consumer, relations 
with the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), and other matters. None was adopted. 
In general, the governments ignored the ESCF. They gave it no budget or other material or 
administrative aid, and did not consult with the ESCF on labor matters. Without resources, the 
ESCF was unable to reach out to the general public, which remained unaware of its existence or 
its work. 
Despite disappointment with its concrete results, however, the ESCF had the beneficial effect of 
providing space for civil society sectors in each country to learn about each other's concerns, to 
develop institutional rules, procedures and customs for tripartite work, and to seek common 
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ground on social aspects of regional economic integration. These were important 
the new framework created by the Social-Labor Declaration of Mercosur. 
Social-Labor Declaration of Mercosur 
The Social-Labor Declaration of December 10, 1998, and the move to create a Mercosur Social-
Labor Commission, are the newest and most significant developments. Emitted not by a working 
group or even a council of ministers, but by the heads of state of the four Mercosur member 
countries, the Declaration has exceptional solemnity and authoritativeness. The creation of a 
new, permanent Social-Labor Commission gives added impetus to the social dimension in 
Mercosur. 
In its Preamble, the Declaration invokes ILO Conventions, the 1998 ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
1995 Copenhagen Summit and other multilateral and regional human rights instruments. The 
content of the Declaration covers the usual core labor standards - freedom of association, child 
labor, forced labor and non-discrimination. But it ranges beyond a core to address migrant 
workers' rights, the right to strike, social dialogue, employment and unemployment, training, 
health and safety, labor inspection and social security. 
The Declaration also contains a novelty in international labor rights instruments: a management's 
rights clause. This language declares that "[T]he employer has the right to organize and direct 
economically and technically the enterprise, in conformity with national law and practice."28 
According to trade union and government representatives and advisors of WG10, the employer 
representatives' initial proposal called for a long recitation of employers' rights including the 
right to hire and fire with more flexibility, the right to change employees' work schedules, the 
right to make and move investments at will, the sanctity of private property, the permanence of a 
free enterprise system, the separation of powers, and more. 
The Declaration does not establish harmonized norms and has no linkage to the Mercosur trade 
regime imposing economic sanctions for violations of workers' rights ~ key trade union goals for 
a social charter. Instead, the member countries "commit themselves to respect the fundamental 
rights inscribed in this Declaration and to promote its application in conformity with national law 
and practice and with collective contracts and agreements."29 In its closing article, the 
Declaration says "The Parties emphasize that their Declaration and its followup mechanisms 
cannot be invoked or used for other ends not contained herein; prohibited, in particular, its 
application to trade, economic, and financial matters."30 
'Article 7. 
'Article 20. 
'Article 25. 
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The Declaration's application and foliowup clause creates a tripartite Mercosur Social-Labor 
Commission that reports to the Common Market Group. Composed of 12 government, labor and 
business members (one per sector per country), the Commission is empowered to act by 
consensus to: 
• review annual reports from governments; 
• develop recommendations; 
• examine "difficulties and mistakes in the application and fulfillment" of the Declaration; 
• write its own analyses and reports on application and fulfillment; and 
• shape proposals for modifying the text of the Declaration. 
Each government must submit an annual report to the Commission on changes in national law 
and practice on matters addressed in the Declaration, on progress in promoting the Declaration, 
and on difficulties in applying it. Based on an examination of these reports, the Commission 
prepares a comprehensive report to the CMG. 
The Declaration authorized an interim tripartite Commission to formulate a Regulation for the 
functioning of the permanent body. September 3, 1999, was given as a deadline for completing 
this task and submitting a Regulation to the CMG for approval. However, the deadline was not 
met. Labor and business members of the interim Commission clashed sharply on such matters as 
the frequency of Commission meetings; whether presidency should rotate among government 
members only or among members from all three sectors; the role of outside experts and advisors 
and whether they can participate in Commission meetings; requirements for a quorum; the right 
to release dissident or minority reports when consensus cannot be achieved; and public 
disclosure of Commission proceedings. Most important, they could not reach consensus on an 
adequate budget and creation of a permanent staff secretariat for the Commission. In meetings at 
the end of August and early September 1999 the sectors remained at impasse on these matters. 
The deadline has been extended. 
Evaluation 
The debate over Mercosur's social dimension mirrors that in other multilateral and regional 
settings. Governments are reluctant to cede sovereign power over labor matters to a new, 
untested supranational authority or to create international norms that trump national law. 
Employers complain that the Social-Labor Declaration is too favorable to the trade union agenda 
and fails to promote much needed (from their perspective) flexibilization of labor law and 
practice in the region. However, they count as a victory the fact that the Declaration does not 
have linkage to trade disciplines with potential for economic sanctions. 
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Unions see the Declaration as lacking "teeth" precisely because it does not establish harmonized 
standards or trade sanctions against labor rights violators. Furthermore, it fails to halt harmful 
(from their point of view) trends toward flexibilization, whether such changes stem from de facto 
moves by management or from labor law reforms often demanded by the International Monetary 
Fund or other international financial institutions. In the trade unions' view, such flexibilization 
undermines workers' rights won through decades of struggle, including struggle against military 
dictatorships in all four Mercosur countries. 
At the same time, trade unions welcome the progress represented by the Declaration, seeing it as 
forward movement in a long march toward an effective social dimension in trade.31 They also 
value the significant role afforded to labor in the tripartite structure of the Commission, and the 
possibility of later revisions to the text of the Declaration in a review process required after two 
years of operation "in view of its dynamic character and advances in the process of subregional 
economic integration."32 
Equally important for both employers and trade unions, their involvement in a new Mercosur 
social dynamic has compelled a broadening and deepening of social dialogue. This result has 
been achieved at both the Mercosur level and the national level, since each tripartite Mercosur 
body has four national tripartite organisms underneath it. Tripartite meetings have also been held 
at Mercosur and national levels for different economic sectors, notably textiles and apparel, 
transportation, printing, agroindustry and telecommunications. 
One result of this new dynamic is something employers and trade unions in North America have 
not been able to accomplish: negotiation of a single collective agreement across national borders 
between trade unions and a major multinational corporation. In April 1999 Volkswagen of Brazil 
and Volkswagen of Argentina negotiated a collective agreement with metalworkers unions of the 
two countries. The agreement recognizes the new context of Mercosur's trading arrangements. It 
calls for exchange of information, measures to improve competitiveness, rapid and amicable 
dispute resolution, enhanced worker training, recognition of factory committees, and a 
commitment "to continually improve this contract, in a dynamic and consensual manner, 
including important matters for the permanent social dialogue of Mercosur."33 
3
'Interviews with trade union and employer representatives and advisors, Sao Paulo and Brasilia, Brazil, August 
19-25, 1999. 
32Article24. 
33See Contrato Coletivo entre a Volkswagen do Brasil Ltda. e Volkswagen de Argentina S.A. e o Sindicato dos 
Metalurgicos do ABC, Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Industrias e Oficinas Metalurgicas, Mecanicas e de 
Material Eletrico e Eletronico de Taubete, Tremembe e Distritos, a Confederacao Nacional dos Metalurgicos da 
CUT, e o Sindicato de Macanicos e Afins de Transporte Automotor da Republica da Argentina e as Comissoes 
Internas de Fabrica, April 16, 1999. 
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When Mercosur was launched in 1991 with the Treaty of Asuncion, a passing mention of "social 
justice" in the Preamble was the only reference to a social dimension. But Mercosur countries 
quickly realized the need to respond to demands of workers, trade unions and allied civil society 
forces for instruments and mechanisms to ensure that expanding regional trade did not create 
new incentives for social dumping and worker exploitation to obtain competitive advantage. 
Governments and social actors have forged new institutions and new relationships. The Social-
Labor Declaration of Mercosur and its Social-Labor Commission are the latest results of the new 
dynamic, but surely not the last. Based on experiences still to come, the tripartite actors will 
continue to build Mercosur's social dimension. 
THE CANADA-CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE CANADA-CHILE 
AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION 
When NAFTA was approved and implemented in 1994, expectations were high that Chile would 
soon become a fourth party to the agreement. Negotiations toward this end were derailed, 
however, with the peso crash at the end of 1994 and the resulting economic crisis in Mexico. 
Growing anti-NAFTA sentiment in the United States led to President Clinton's failure to obtain 
renewed Fast Track negotiating authority from Congress after it expired in 1994. Chile did not 
want to have the terms of its accession to NAFTA picked apart by Congress, so negotiations on 
NAFTA accession stopped.34 
Instead of pursuing the NAFTA route, Chile undertook a series of bilateral trade negotiations 
with Canada, Mexico and Mercosur. Canada and Chile signed a trade agreement in 1996 and 
followed in early 1997 with the Canada-Chile Agreement on Labor Cooperation (CCALC). In 
most substantive respects, the CCALC is identical to the NAALC. It sets forth the same eleven 
labor principles and related obligations for effective enforcement of national law. It creates a 
Commission for Labor Cooperation to oversee the accord. 
Like the NAALC, the CCALC emphasizes cooperative consultations and cooperative work 
programs. It also provides a similar mechanism for receiving complaints ("public 
communications"), for independent evaluations by independent committees of experts, and 
dispute resolution by ad hoc arbitral panels. As with the NAALC, the eleven labor principles of 
the CCALC are divided into three tiers, limiting dispute resolution to child labor, minimum 
wage, or health and safety labor law enforcement. In a targeted but significant deviation from 
the NAALC, sanctions under the CCALC's dispute resolution mechanism stop with fines against 
34
"Fast track" is Washington shorthand for the constitutionally necessary delegation of trade negotiating 
authority from Congress to the President. Under fast track terms, any trade agreement negotiated by the executive 
must be voted up or down by Congress with no amendments. Without fast track, individual members of the House 
or Senate may propose amendments to protect their local industries. Trade partners are generally reluctant to 
negotiate with the United States without fast track conditions, since Congress might then repudiate any U.S. 
concessions. 
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an offending government. It does not take the further step provided in the NAALC of potential 
trade sanctions through loss of beneficial tariff treatment against a company or industry that 
violates workers' rights. 
As a bilateral pact, several of the trinational features of the NAALC are transformed in the 
CCALC. Obviously the Ministerial Council consists of two, not three labor ministers. There is 
no permanent, trinational Secretariat created to serve the Council. Instead, the functions of the 
NAALC Secretariat and the three NAOs are combined in a CCALC national secretariat in each 
country. Canada's same National Administrative Office - now renamed the Office of Inter-
American Labour Cooperation — performs this function for Ottawa. The national secretariats are 
responsible for developing cooperative activities, preparing reports and studies, supporting any 
committee or working group set up by the Council, and receiving and reviewing public 
communications on labor law matters arising in the other country. 
From the start, the Canadian and Chilean governments announced that they would not 
substantively deviate from the NAALC in their negotiations on a labor agreement. Since it was 
still hoped that Chile would eventually accede to NAFTA, the bilateral negotiators did not want 
changes in their agreement that might require a full-scale renegotiation on terms of accession. 
Canadian and Chilean trade unions and NGOs roundly criticized this stance. They argued that 
new labor negotiations should be seen as an opportunity to improve the "toothless" NAALC.35 
Labor rights advocates also protested the implication in the agreement that Chilean labor law and 
practice conforms to the eleven labor principles. While the harshly repressive Pinochet labor 
code was eased by a series of reforms after Chile returned to democratic rule, several features 
that arguably violate the accord's labor principles remain in place. These include provisions: 
• permitting wide latitude for employers to dismiss workers, including union organizers 
and supporters, based on "needs of the business" as defined by the employer; 
• denying organizing and collective bargaining rights to public employees and to seasonal 
and temporary workers; 
• frustrating collective bargaining negotiations above the level of the single workplace; 
• denying union access to corporate financial information for use in collective bargaining; 
• severely limiting the topics susceptible to collective bargaining; 
• limiting the right to strike and permitting permanent replacements. 
35See Labor charges Canada missing chance to improve side agreements in Chile pact, 1996 BNA Daily Labor 
Report No. 87, Bureau of National Affairs (May 6, 1996), at A-8. 
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Further reforms to cure some of these deficiencies have been introduced by the Chilean 
government but blocked by the unelected, appointed bloc of senators in Chile's upper house. 
This is seen by critics as itself evidence of a continuing democratic deficit there, calling into 
question Chile's readiness to sign a labor accord with Canada espousing the labor principles.36 
Notwithstanding these problems, Canada and Chile signed their labor cooperation agreement on 
February 6, 1997, and it went into effect on July 9,1997. Since then, the two national secretariats 
have undertaken an ambitious cooperative work program with several workshops, seminars and 
conferences similar to those sponsored under the NAALC. The CCALC Ministerial Council met 
in Santiago on October 22, 1998 to review accomplishments of the first year of the agreement's 
operation and to approve the first annual report on the agreement.37 
The cooperative work program began with a seminar in Santiago in January, 1998, on individual 
employment standards and occupational health and safety legislation. It covered labor standards 
and enforcement systems, compensation for workplace injuries and illnesses, and mining 
industry health and safety. Later events, some government-to-government and some involving 
employer and trade union representatives, took place in Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, and again in 
Santiago. Subjects taken up included industrial relations legislation and the role of labor boards 
and labor courts in regulating labor-management relations and resolving disputes;38 new forms 
of work and the implications for industrial relations; income security; and workplace health and 
safety. 
Most recently, a public conference on Working Women in the 21st Century took place in 
Santiago on September 1-3, 1999. The agenda included women's participation rates and 
employment patterns, work and family issues, legislation affecting women workers, and 
emerging trends and innovations. 
Canadian employer and trade union representatives have participated in tripartite public events in 
both countries, as have Chilean employer representatives. However, Chilean trade unionists have 
only joined events that took place in Santiago. 
Contrary to the NAALC experience, no complaints have yet been filed under the CCALC. 
Chilean unions have also not taken up offers from their Canadian counterparts to file complaints 
36See Carol Pier, Labor Rights in Chile and NAFTA Labor Standards: Questions of Compatibility on the Eve of 
Free Trade, 19 COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW AND POLICY JOURNAL 185 (Winter 1998). 
37The annual report is available at the web site of the Canadian national secretariat, http://labour.hrdc-
drhc.gc.ca/doc/ialc-cidt/eng/e/backen.htm. 
38Canadian trade unionists at the April 1998 conference in Ottawa raised sharp, probing questions for Chilean 
government representatives on what they saw as critical deficiencies in Chilean labor law. Chilean spokesmen 
fended off criticisms with claims that the basic labor law structure reflected the labor principles and that the 
government was working to correct remaining problems. 
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under the CCALC to bring problems of Chilean labor law and practice under international 
scrutiny afforded by the agreement.39 
THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CHARTER OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is an association of English-speaking Caribbean 
nations created in 1973 to develop a common market and coordinated policies among the 
member states.40 Faced with the rise of regional trade agreements around them, in particular the 
new comparative advantages afforded Mexico under NAFTA, CARICOM countries have 
accelerated efforts to overcome still strong distinctions and rivalries and build an effective trade 
group.41 
CARICOM's social dimension is grounded in the Charter of Civil Society of the Caribbean 
Community, signed in 1994 and adopted by the countries in 1997. The purpose of the Charter is 
captured in a statement by the commission that drafted it: 
CARICOM needs normative moorings; we have found widespread yearning 
for giving the community a qualitative character ~ values beyond the routine 
of integration arrangements to which [economic integration] can be made to 
conform. The Charter can become the soul of the Community which needs a 
soul if it is to command the loyalty of the people of CARICOM.42 
The Charter of Civil Society is a comprehensive human rights instrument composed of 27 
articles. Most notably, in comparison with similar international efforts, the CARICOM Charter 
subjects private actors — namely, the "social partners"43 — as well as states to its oversight 
mechanism. The first grouping of articles cover classical civil and political rights — human 
dignity and the right to life, liberty and security of the person; equality before the law; political 
freedom; freedom of association, expression and religion. Article X, on cultural diversity, shifts 
The instrument's focus to economic and social rights reflected in clauses on indigenous peoples, 
"Interview with Canadian Labour Congress representative, August 1999. 
40CARICOM members are Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. Haiti is close to becoming a member, which will change the group's linguistic character. Associate 
members are Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands. 
A]See Gary Younge, Caribbean at the crossroads: ...the region's search for an identity to call its own, The 
Guardian (London), April 15, 1999, at 2. 
42Cited in CARICOM Secretariat statement on Declaration of Industrial and Labour Relations Principles (see 
below), January 6, 1999. 
43
"Social partners" are defined in Article I as "the government of a State, Associations of Employers, Workers' 
Organizations and such Non-Governmental Organizations as the State may recognize." 
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women, children and the disabled; access to education and training; health; participation in the 
economy; environmental rights; and good governance. 
Two articles of the Charter relate to a social dimension. Article XIX on Workers' Rights is the 
longest single article of the Charter. It guarantees to "every worker" the right to form or belong to 
a trade union, to bargain collectively, not to be subjected to unfair labor practices, to a safe 
workplace, to reasonable hours and pay, and to withhold his or her labor. An exception is made 
for public employees "which are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society."44 
Article XIX goes on to state obligations of governments to: 
• safeguard workers' right to freely choose occupations; 
• recognize the desirability of decent pay; 
• provide machinery for recognition and certification of trade unions freely chosen by a 
maj ority of workers; 
• sensitize workers, unions and employers as to their respective and mutual obligations; 
• provide protection against arbitrary dismissal; 
• provide machinery for industrial dispute resolution; 
• provide maternity leave and retum-to-work rights after pregnancy; 
• establish standards to ensure a safe and healthy workplace; 
• provide adequate social security; and 
• ensure social and medical assistance to retired persons.45 
Article XXII on Social Partners states briefly the undertaking of the governments to establish a 
framework for genuine consultation among the social partners on the objectives, contents and 
implementation of national economic and social programs and their respective roles and 
responsibilities in good governance. 
The followup mechanism in Article XXV calls for periodic reports to the CARICOM Secretary-
General on measures adopted and progress achieved in compliance with the Charter. Reports 
44
 Article XIX, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
45Id., paragraph3. 
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should also indicate "factors and difficulties, if any" affecting implementation.46 Governments 
should also consult with social partners in preparing the reports, and establish in each country a 
National Committee to oversee Charter implementation. The National Committee is made up of 
government representatives, representatives of the social partners, and "other persons of high 
moral character and recognized competence in their respective fields of endeavor."47 The first 
reports are due in 2000. 
The Charter contains a complaint mechanism by which citizens may file with their National 
Committee "reports of allegations of breaches of, or non-compliance with" the Charter. 
Significantly, complaints may cite violations "attributed to the state or to one or more social 
partners."48 No such complaints have been filed under the Charter as yet.49 
The National Committee must notify the state or social partner named in the complaint and 
request comments on the allegation. The complaint, comments, and the Committee's "own 
views" are then reported to the Secretary-General for forwarding to the Conference of Heads of 
Governments of the Caribbean Community. The deliberations of the Conference and any 
recommendations are sent back to the government and the National Committee of the country 
involved.50 
No further action is contemplated under the CARICOM Charter in cases alleging violations of 
Charter provisions, including workers' rights. The Charter establishes an oversight system 
relying on peer pressure and moral force to change behavior or correct injustices. There is no 
linkage to CARICOM trading arrangements and no plan for economic sanctions against human 
rights and workers' rights violators. Because the Charter took effect only last year, there have 
been no complaints or reports yet filed under its oversight mechanism.51 
The CARICOM Declaration of Labour and Industrial Relations Principles 
In April 1993, the Standing Committee of Ministers Responsible for Labour of CARICOM 
commissioned the drafting of a Declaration of Labour and Industrial Relations Principles for the 
46Article XXV, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
47Id., paragraphs 3 and 4(1). 
4SJd., paragraph 4 (2). 
49
 According to a CARICOM representative, "Civil society is looking more at the specific national regulations 
than at the Charter as they view problems, etc. in a national context rather than in a regional context" (e-mail 
interview, September 13, 1999, on file with author). 
50Id., paragraphs 4 (3) and 5. 
5IE-mail interview with CARICOM Secretariat staff, August 12, 1999. 
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Community. A two-year process of consultation with trade unions, employer groups and labor 
law scholars led to the Ministers' adopting the Declaration in April 1995. 
The Declaration is characterized by the Standing Committee of Ministers Responsible for Labour 
as "an important policy guide on labour matters for the social partners [that] provides the bases 
for the development of national labour policies, and informs the enactment of labour 
legislation."52 It is described by the Secretariat as "an expansion" of workers' rights in Article 
XIX of the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society. A Secretariat statement accompanying the 
Declaration points to "the tradition of adversarial industrial relations" in the region and an 
"urgent need for better cooperation amongst the social partners to combat the burning issues 
brought by globalisation, trade liberalisation and structural adjustment programmes." 
The Declaration begins by invoking the CARICOM Charter, the ILO's Declaration of 
Philadelphia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and ILO conventions and 
recommendations. The Declaration's 45 articles cover freedom of association, collective 
bargaining, non-discrimination in employment, forced labor, health and safety, job training and 
career promotion, employment policy, labor administration, dispute settlement, consultation and 
tripartism, and many other aspects of labor and employment relations. 
As indicated earlier, the Declaration is a policy guide that is purely hortatory. It has no binding 
force. It is not linked to trade disciplines that would permit economic sanctions against violators. 
No oversight or followup mechanism is contained in the Declaration, although its terms could 
certainly be relied on in complaints arising under the Charter. 
CARICOM Social Security Agreement 
Separate from the Charter or Declaration, the CARICOM nations signed a social security 
agreement in 1996 to ensure continuity of social insurance for persons employed or retired 
outside their country of origin. To date, eleven member states have ratified the agreement. As 
with the Mercosur social security agreement, the pact does not harmonize benefits at a 
community-wide level, but seeks to ensure that workers will receive what is due them for work 
performed in other countries. 
The agreement sets conditions for eligibility of workers in different economic sectors, methods 
of calculating employment credits, and determination of benefits. It regulates such matters as 
dependents' coverage, survivors' benefits, disability benefits, and medical examinations. It 
establishes a mechanism for filing claims and spells out documents that should accompany 
claims. Finally, the social security agreement creates a dispute resolution mechanism using ad 
'CARICOM Declaration of Labour and Industrial Relations Principles, Foreword. 
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claims. Finally, the social security agreement creates a dispute resolution mechanism using ad 
hoc arbitral panels to settle conflicts between governments.53 
CONCLUSION 
The four labor rights-in-trade experiments examined here are still new. States and social actors 
are still learning which features are successful and should be kept, which have failed and should 
be changed, and which are still untried and bear testing. The most instructive distinctions emerge 
in three key areas: (1) tripartism; (2) complaint and oversight mechanisms; and (3) "soft" moral 
sanctions versus "hard" economic sanctions. 
Tripartism 
The trinational NAALC and the binational CCALC limit the institutional role of employers, 
trade unions, NGOs and other elements of civil society. These social actors engage the social 
dimension of trade mainly by filing complaints and pressing governments for action. In contrast, 
the Mercosur and CARICOM arrangements give greater weight to tripartism in their institutional 
structures. Employers, trade unions, and sometimes other social actors have formal roles in 
Mercosur's working groups, forum and commission, both at the Mercosur level and in national 
bodies. The same civil society forces participate formally in the national committees that take up 
matters under the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society. 
Complaints and Oversight 
Alongside cooperation and consultation between governments, NAALC and CCALC submission 
and oversight mechanisms contemplate specific complaints by social actors against governments 
and firms that allegedly violate workers' rights. Complaints may be followed by public hearings, 
public reports, evaluations and recommendations by independent, non-governmental experts, and 
dispute resolution by independent arbitrators. In contrast, Mercosur and CARICOM integrate the 
social actors into their institutional regimes. Complaints can be filed with tripartite national 
bodies under both systems, but governments retain control of outcomes with little apparent space 
for public hearings or other forms of public pressure by social actors. There is no place for 
independent, non-governmental decision making. 
Sanctions 
The issue of sanctions is another marker of key differences among the four systems studied here. 
A spectrum of sanctions can range from "soft" reproof like self-reporting requirements or quiet 
diplomatic chiding among governments to "hard" reproof like fines or trade sanctions. 
Intermediate measures involve escalating investigations, reviews and reports, independent 
53The CARICOM Social Security Agreement is available at the Community's web site at 
http://www.caricom.org/socsec.htm. 
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publicize behavior by states, industries and firms. While such measures are often dismissed as 
toothless, public exposure can sometimes have economic consequences that also changes abusive 
behavior. 
CARICOM is silent on the subject of sanctions. Its oversight mechanism is limited. Once 
citizens have filed a complaint with a national committee, the sequence that follows is one of 
reports, comments, and non-binding recommendations. Mercosur explicitly renounces economic 
sanctions in Article 25 of the Social-Labor Declaration. Instead, it sees labor rights matters best 
addressed by a robust tripartite dynamic and moral pressure by the Common Market Group, the 
Council, and if necessary by heads of state. 
The CCALC permits fines against a government for systematic failure to enforce laws on child 
labor, minimum wage, or occupational safety and health, but precludes suspension of the trade 
agreement's tariff benefits. The NAALC takes this final step, allowing sanctions against 
companies or firms that violate workers' rights, though it must be kept in mind that this measure 
has never been applied and would seemingly only be applied in unusual circumstances. 
AFTERWORD: LOOKING AHEAD TO THE FTAA 
The models and variations in American regional trade arrangements reviewed here will 
ultimately be taken up in talks to link NAFTA, Mercosur and other regional trade agreements in 
a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). At a December 1994 summit meeting in 
Miami, Western hemisphere presidents and prime ministers announced intentions to achieve the 
FTAA by 2005. 
The issue of a social dimension to the FTAA has already been joined. The 34 heads of state 
(missing only Cuba) began free trade talks at a widely reported "Summit of the Americas" in 
Santiago, Chile, in April 1998. A parallel "peoples' summit" in Santiago attracted more than 
1,000 leaders and activists from trade unions and non-governmental organizations throughout the 
hemisphere. These summiteers launched an ambitious program of their own to force social 
issues like labor, environmental and human rights concerns onto the governments' free trade 
agenda. 
The governments have not ignored these developments. A final document by the heads of state in 
Santiago called for a "social action plan" to promote core ILO labor standards, improve 
education, reduce poverty and inequality, expand democracy, and guarantee human rights. The 
governments also agreed to create a Committee on Civil Society, with Canada as interim chair, to 
officially hear the views of labor, environmental and other non-governmental organizations as 
FTAA negotiations proceed.54 
54Trade unions and NGOs have created a Hemispheric Social Alliance to coordinate action on the FTAA. Part of 
their work has been the elaboration of an Alternatives for the Americas document detailing elements of a social 
dimension in any hemispheric trade agreement. The Alternatives document is available at the web site of the 
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A social dimension in the FTAA could take shape by combining elements of the models outlined 
here - the NAALC's complaint system, Mercosur's tripartism, CARICOM's national 
committees, for example. Alternatively, FTAA countries could agree to maintain these seperate 
regional systems even while economic integration proceeds, allowing a longer period of 
expermentation with different models. Understanding and evaluating with the four 
"works in progress - studied here will play a large part in shaping the social dimension of 
hemispheric integration. 
Canadian group Common Frontiers at www.web.net/~comfront. 
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